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Domain theory suggests that moral rules and conventions are perceived differently and elicit a 
different response. A special procedure was designed to test this hypothesis in a laboratory setting 
using a deontic reasoning task. The goal was to gain insight into the cognitive and metacognitive 
processes of deontic reasoning from simple deontic premises. In the 3x2x2 within-subjects design, 
we varied rule-content (moral, conventional, abstract), rule-type (obligation, permission) and the 
induced dilemma (punishment dilemma, reward dilemma). Participants (N = 78) were presented 
with 12 laws. After memorizing a law, eight cases were presented to participants so that they make 
a quick judgment. Participants were tasked with punishing rule-violators, ignoring rule-conformists, 
and rewarding rule-supererogation. Response times (RT) and accuracy were measured for each 
judgment, and final confidence was measured after a set of judgments. No differences were expected 
between rule-types, except for superior performance for moral content and punishment dilemmas. 
RT correlated negatively with confidence levels, while accuracy correlated positively. Moral 
reasoning was more accurate than conventional and abstract reasoning, and produced higher 
confidence levels. Better performance was found for punishment dilemmas than reward dilemmas, 
likely due to the presence of a cheater-detection module; but the differences were not found in moral 
reasoning. Moral reasoning was also independent of rule-type, while conventional and abstract 
reasoning produced superior performance in obligation-type than in permission-type rules. A large 
drop-off in accuracy was detected for rules that allowed undesirable behaviour, a phenomenon we 
termed the "deontic blind spot". However, this blind spot was not present in moral reasoning. Three 
lines of evidence indicate a qualitative difference between the moral and other deontic domains: (1) 
performance for moral content was independent of rule-type, (2) moral content produced an equal 
activation of violator- and altruist-detection modules, and (3) moral content produces higher levels 
of confidence. 
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Prosocial behaviour was often an adaptive strategy to our ancestors (Dawkins, 
1976), evolving a variety of moral cognitive tools (Greene, 2014). Cultural forces 
later sorted those tools into more coherent sets of ideas, rituals or philosophies (Haidt, 
2012). 
From the early 20th century, psychologists began to take an interest in what 
makes people act nobly and unselfishly (Haidt, 2008). Later, Kohlberg's (1976) 
research pioneered the field of modern moral psychology. His rationalist approach 
posited that through exploring and navigating their social environments, children 
develop their reasoning abilities in six stages of morality. 
 
Moral and Social Domains 
 
Turiel, Killen, and Helwig (1987) distinguish between the domain of morality 
and social convention. According to their definition, morality is concerned with 
topics of justice, rights and harm, while conventions (the social domain) are usually 
culturally determined and often arbitrary. Tisak and Turiel (1988) have found that 
children hold different opinions about transgressions in the two domains, and Blair 
(1997) found that children with psychopathic tendencies have difficulties in 
recognizing the moral/conventional distinction. Therefore, the main difference 
between the two domains seems to be that the moral input primes an affective 
response that adds more weight to the importance of moral rules. 
The view that conventions should be considered as separate from morality has 
been criticized due to different cultures perceiving some of the conventional 
questions as a part of their societies' moral structure (Haidt, 2012). Nevertheless, the 
moral and conventional content for this study was selected using this distinction, 
since WEIRD samples (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), like the sample 





Recently, the role of strategic reasoning as the bedrock of moral reasoning has 
been subordinated in favour of the role of moral emotions and intuition, culminating 
in the formulation of the Social-intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001). It posits that a 
morally salient input causes an automatic emotional response that results in guiding 
the moral reasoning process. Strategic reasoning, from that point, is a source of 
justification and social propaganda. 
So, how is the moral content of a stimulus recognized before the onset of 
strategic reasoning? And how does the automatic moral response interfere with the 
reasoning process? The answer to both questions is offered by the Social intuitionist's 
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sister-theory – the Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012). People differ in the 
sensitivity of six mechanisms: harm/care, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2011), and 
liberty/oppression (Iyer, Spassena, Graham, & Haidt, 2012). When the content of a 
stimulus is related to one of those foundations, then the more sensitive a person's 
foundation is, the more likely it is that a moralistic response will be triggered. This 
response influences moral judgment and drives the strategic process of justification. 
Haidt (2007) presents four lines of evidence for the Social intuitionist model, the 
most important of them being moral dumbfounding. First, a person is presented with 
a moral dilemma that creates a strong irrational response. Next, he is confronted by 
the interviewer with arguments that falsify the emotion-driven intuition. After 
exhausting all the reasons, the person stubbornly persists in the initial position, while 
admitting to being dumbfounded by his inability to articulate any rational arguments 
for that position (Haidt, 2001). 
The moral content of rules in the current study was chosen to elicit a response 
from only the first two foundations: care/harm, and fairness/cheating. Although one 
of the premises of Social intuitionism is that questions of justice and care do not 
cover the entire moral domain (Haidt, 2001, 2007, 2008, 2012), these two 
foundations are endorsed by both liberals and (to a lesser degree) conservatives, 
while the rest are usually perceived as conventions by liberals. Since students in 
social sciences generally (Haidt, 2012), and at the University of Zadar in particular 
(Sudić & Didović, 2018) lean toward the left, we assumed they would react more 
strongly, on average, to the first two foundations – likely only recognizing them as 
part of the moral domain. 
 
Metacognition and Dual-Processing 
 
The divide between "rationalists" and "social intuitionists" is still alive, and 
some alternative theories of moral processing have also been proposed (e.g. 
Bucciarelli, Khemlani, & Johnson-Laird, 2008; Mikhail, 2007). One of them is 
Greene's (2014) dual-processing paradigm – an approach that seems to bridge that 
divide. 
Greene (2014) claims that in everyday circumstances, we use simple heuristics 
(intuitions) to determine right from wrong in a way Social intuitionism predicts. 
These typically take the form of a deontological judgment (morality based on inner 
principles). However, when needed, or if properly cued, we can engage in deliberate 
reasoning that can override the initial intuition, and produce a utilitarian response 
(moral cost/benefit analysis), which is more in line with the Rationalist model. Most 
of the research within this paradigm was conducted using a variation of the trolley 
scenario: "a trolley is about to kill five people, but there is an option of redirecting it 
to only kill one person." A deontological response would be to not intervene 
(redirecting the trolley would be murder, which is intrinsically wrong), and a 
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utilitarian response would be to sacrifice the one person (killing one person to save 
five is a net-good). 
In parallel, a different dual-processing paradigm was being developed within 
the reasoning literature (e.g. Ackerman & Thompson, 2015; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). The term "reasoning" is used differently from the one typically used in moral 
psychology. Thus far, we used it to denote strategic and deliberate thinking in moral 
dilemmas. In the cognitive literature, reasoning is a broader term that refers to 
cognitive processes of drawing a conclusion from premises (Kellogg, 1995), whether 
those premises are explicit or not (Bucciarelli et al., 2008). The "reasoning" task used 
in this study also refers to the latter definition. 
According to the dual-process approach, cognitive processes can be divided into 
Type 1 and Type 2 thinking, the former being fast, automatic and based on heuristics; 
while the latter is conscious, logical and cognitively taxing (see Kahneman, 2013). 
Recently, Evans and Stanovich (2013) pointed out that the only remaining defining 
features of the two systems are automaticity for Type 1, and cognitive decoupling for 
Type 2 processes. The rest of these features simply happen to co-occur (e.g. Type 1 
being fast, or Type 2 being conscious), but are non-essential properties. 
Metacognition is a system that monitors these subsystems. It responds to subtle 
cues like fluency (the ease of response production), in order to mediate between the 
processes of the two systems (Thompson, 2009), while accuracy may or may not be 
tracked by metacognition (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). It seems that in order for 
accuracy to influence metacognition, a response conflict has to actually be detected, 
i.e. a person must realize the difficulty of a task. Since the difficulty of a task will be 
proportional to its accuracy rate, if the conflict is detected, the metacognitive 
judgment should correlate with accuracy. 
One can gauge the current status of the metacognitive system in multiple ways, 
for example by asking the participants to assess their level of confidence in a given 
answer (confidence judgment) or a set of given answers (final confidence judgment; 
Ackerman & Thompson, 2015). Final confidence was used in this study to gain 
insight into the higher cognitive processes after a set of judgments. We wanted to 
know whether people were more confident while reasoning under the influence of 
the moral affect, as is the case when reasoning from intuition, i.e. Type 1 (De Neys 
& Bialek, 2017). We expect that response time (a measure of fluency), but not 
necessarily accuracy, will predict confidence levels (Ackerman & Thompson, 2015). 
 
Deontic Logic as Normative Framework 
 
In order to obtain a measure of "accuracy", it is important to select its normative 
framework. In this case, normative accuracy will be defined as logical consistency 
in reasoning (in the text, the word "normative" will be dropped for brevity's sake). 
Deontic logic uses two basic deontic operators: obligation and permission. Since 
either can be negated, this creates four possible deontic categories: (1) obligation, (2) 
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non-obligation, (3) permission, and (4) non-permission. Act-individuals – actors for 
whom a given rule applies – have two possible action-values: performing and not-
performing an action. This creates eight possible combinations of rules and action-
values of act-individuals. These deontic relations fall into one of three categories: 
violation, conformity/indifference, and supererogation (Beller, 2010; Broersen et al., 
2013; Heyd, 2016; Von Wright, 1951). Each of these relations demands an 
appropriate response in this experiment: punishment, ignoring, or reward, 
respectively (see Figure 1). 
We only selected actions that were clearly either desirable or undesirable. 
Although formal deontic logic is neutral to the desirability of an action (Von Wright, 
1951), in real life, almost without exception, obligations are used to govern desirable 
behaviours, while permissions govern undesirable ones. To illustrate this, consider 
the absurdity of a rule that permits desirable behaviour (e.g. you are permitted to 
donate to charity), the needlessness of a rule that does not obligate undesirable 
behaviour (e.g. you are not obligated to eat your child), or an irrationality of any rule 
that obligates one to do bad, or does not permit one to do good. In order to avoid 
confusion from the unrealistic structure of rules, desirable content was restricted to 
(non)obligation rules and the undesirable to (non)permission rules. 
If one correctly memorizes a rule, after observing an act-individual, one of two 
possible dilemmas is induced: a punishment dilemma (to punish or ignore?) or a 
reward dilemma (to reward or ignore?). These dilemmas fit the parameters for the 
activation of cheater-detection (Cosmides & Tooby, 2015) and altruist-detection 
(Oda, Hiraishi, & Matsumoto-Oda, 2006) modules. A punishment dilemma is 
induced by rules that put an actual constraint on the action by either obligating or not 
permitting it. This means an act-individual can either conform to the rule or violate 
it. On the other hand, a reward dilemma is induced by rules that remove constraints 
on actions (non-obligations/permissions), thus providing liberty to act as one pleases. 
This gives the actor an option to conform to a lack of constraints, or freely choose 
the supererogatory (altruist) option. 
 
Detection of Altruists and Cheaters 
 
Using the deontic framework we can induce different types of dilemmas in 
participants by presenting them with a task to detect violators, conformists and the 
supererogatory. We expect that in order to easily solve one of these dilemmas, 
participants will engage one or more of the domain-specific reasoning algorithms. 
Since both the ability to detect cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 2015) and a concurrent 
ability to detect altruists (Oda et al., 2006) evolved to solve similar dilemmas (e.g. 
social exchange), it seems those two algorithms are the most likely to be used when 
solving a punishment or a reward dilemma, respectively. The endgame of altruist- 
and cheater-detection systems is to  direct  adaptive  action (e.g. punishing violators  
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and rewarding altruists), therefore participants in this study were not instructed to 
simply identify whether the act-individual was a violator, conformist or an altruist (a 
cognitive component), but rather to punish, ignore or reward them (behavioural 
reaction). We assumed that this will produce a more natural response from a 
participant than if he/she were simply given a logical reasoning task, thus increasing 
the external validity of the experiment without compromising its internal validity. 
An inability to detect a violator was more likely to produce a catastrophic 
outcome for our ancestors rather than an inability to detect helpful individuals. While 
both systems offer an adaptive advantage to an individual, detecting cheaters is more 
difficult since they benefit from hiding their nefariousness. This puts adaptive 
pressure on the evolution of violation-detection sensitivity (Cosmides & Tooby, 
2015). On the other hand, altruists tend to benefit from virtue signalling – making 
them easier to detect (Dawkins, 1976; Haidt, 2012), which likely puts relatively less 
of an adaptive pressure to evolve equal levels of altruist detection sensitivity. We 
thus hypothesized that the cheater detection algorithm will produce faster and 
possibly more accurate results. 
 
Deontic Reasoning Task 
 
According to Beller (2010), the most popular way to measure deontic reasoning 
is using deontic forms of Wason's task (e.g. Kellogg, 1995; Oda et al., 2006). 
However, the Wason's task is limited to conditional (if-then) reasoning. 
Instead, we constructed a task that resembles a syllogism: 
Major (deontic) premise: It's (not) obligatory/permissible to do A. 
Minor premise: A person is (not) doing A. 
Conclusion: Therefore, the person is a violator/conformist/supererogatory. 
Deontic tasks commonly ask a participant to identify a correct answer or 
identify an activity (e.g. Oda et al., 2006; see Beller, 2010). We went further and 
measured a form of deontic behaviour: participants were tasked with not just sorting 
out violators, conformists and altruists. They were tasked with appropriately 
punishing, ignoring and rewarding them. Both response times and accuracy were 
recorded in this task, as well as final confidence judgments. 
In summation, the goal of this study is to determine how moral, conventional 
and abstract rules were processed based on their deontic type and the dilemma they 
induce. We expected the best performance in moral rules and better performance in 
conventional than in abstract rules. Judgments of confidence were expected to follow 
the same trend. We did not expect to find a difference in obligation or permission 
type rules but expected a faster and more accurate response to punishment than 
reward dilemmas. We expected to find a negative correlation between confidence 
and response time but not necessarily a correlation between accuracy and confidence. 
However, if the response conflict was in fact detected, then the confidence-accuracy 
correlation is expected to be positive. 







The sample (N = 78, 67 female) was recruited among students of psychology at 
the University of Zadar, ages 19-28 (M = 21.62, SD = 2.07). Participants were 




The design of the experiment was 3x2x2 within groups. The independent 
variables were: 
a) Content: moral, conventional, or abstract 
b) Rule type: obligation, or permission 
c) Induced dilemma: punishment dilemma (to punish or to ignore), or reward 
dilemma (to reward or to ignore) 




The independent variables were manipulated through the deontic reasoning task 
form (rule type and induced dilemma) and content.  
Rule type and induced dilemma. Tasks were created based on the type of 
operator used in rules. Obligations provide information on (non-)obligatory actions, 
thus governing desirable behaviour, while permissions govern whether undesirable 
actions are permissible. This is an improvement on the typical form of a deontic task 
(see Beller, 2010), due to the fact that banning or allowing desirable behaviour, as 
well as (non-)obligating undesirable behaviour is either absurd or unnecessary in real 
life. Therefore, experimental stimuli are not wasted on nonsensical rules. "Soft" 
operators (non-obligation, and permission) are designed to induce reward dilemmas 
(to reward or to ignore), while "hard" operators (obligation, and non-permission) 
induce punishment dilemmas (to punish or ignore). 
Content. The content was selected by loosely referring to Haidt's Moral 
foundations theory and Turiel's Domain theory. Moral content was selected using the 
first two foundations, e.g. the law governing deception and honesty. Conventional 
content was selected by referring to Turiel's morality-convention distinction, e.g. the 
law governing car parking. Abstract content was selected by replacing a name of an 
action with an uppercase letter, e.g. "It's obligatory to perform A". See Appendix A 
for a detailed selection of the laws. Within every law, one rule was designed to induce 
the reward dilemma, the other to induce the punishment dilemma. 
Sudić, M., Valerjev, P., Ćirić, J.: 
Deontic Moral Reasoning Task 
491 
Accuracy. Participants were tasked with determining the relationship between 
the prescription of the law and the behaviour of a person. There are three deontic 
relations to the rules: violation, conformity, or supererogatory. Participants had three 
options: ignoring, punishing, or rewarding. It is considered accurate to: 
a) ignore those that conform to rules 
b) punish violators (those that do not perform desirable obligatory acts, or 
perform undesirable impermissible acts) 
c) reward the supererogatory (those that perform desirably even when not 
obligated, or do not perform undesirable acts even when they are 
permissible) 
Condition balancing. Participants had three possible reactions at their disposal 
in the experiment (P-punishing, R-rewarding, I-ignoring), and they reacted to them 
with the index, middle and ring finger of their right hand. It was determined in four 
preliminary studies that simple reaction times significantly differed between the three 
fingers. Therefore, participants were rotated through three conditions of finger-to-
key combinations: IPR, PRI and RIP (the first letter represents the index finger, the 
second the middle finger, the third the ring finger). The IPR condition, for example, 
means that the index finger was matched with the reaction of ignoring, the middle 
finger with punishing, and the ring finger with reward. Secondly, participants were 
also rotated in two other conditions of rule sequencing. For example, if those in 
sequence "a" had a rule ordering within one law of XY, those in sequence "b" had 




The experiment was conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Psychology 
at the University of Zadar. Participants sat across the computer screen, and had a 
written part of the instructions in front of them. The experiment was designed using 
E-Prime version 2.0.10.356. A paper with feedback questions was provided after 
completing the experiment. It included questions about demographics (sex, age, 
subject of study), and a question whether they understood the instructions.  
The procedure consisted of three phases: (1) two practice tasks, (2) the main 
task, (3) feedback. Before the procedure, participants were asked to review 
instructions on the task manual in front of them. They were asked if they had any 
questions, and informed that they would not be allowed to ask anything further once 
the task starts. 
Practice tasks. The first practice task was designed to accustom the participant 
to reacting with the index finger, middle finger, and the ring finger of the right hand. 
It consisted of 30 trials. The second practice task was similar, but instead of reacting 
to numbers corresponding to fingers, participants practiced pairing up fingers with 
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reactions of ignoring, punishing, or rewarding – depending on conditions assigned to 
them. The practice consisted of 90 trials. 
Deontic reasoning task. The DRT consisted of 12 major tasks (each 
corresponding to one law), and 8 minor tasks within each of the major tasks. The 
sequence of major tasks was randomized, as was the sequence of minor tasks within 
them. When one of the major tasks began, the participants were presented with a law, 
a short description of the law, and two rules of which the law consisted. The 
instructions for the task were provided in great detail, including task structure, how 
to react, and what is considered the correct answer. They were instructed to take as 
much time as they needed to memorize the law. Once the participant signaled the 
program that he/she memorized the law, he/she was presented with eight cases (eg. 
John didn't shoplift.) in random order. Four cases referred to the first rule, four to the 
second. Half of those cases performed the action, half abstained from action. Half of 
names were female, the other half male. As soon as the participant reacted by 
rendering judgment, he/she was presented immediately with the next case until all 
eight cases (minor tasks) were exhausted. Response times and accuracy were recorded 
during the rendering of the judgment. After the minor tasks ended, participants were 
asked to rate their final confidence on a scale of 1-7 with the question: How confident 
are you of your performance in the previous task? See Table 1. 
Feedback. After completion, participants were asked to fill out a feedback 
questionnaire, where we asked them whether they understood the performed task, 
and collected data about age and gender. 
 
Table 1 
Examples of Steps of Deontic Tasks Based on the Three Contents 
 Morality Convention Abstract 
Step 1: 
Memorize a law 
with two rules 
(unlimited time). 
 
1. It's not obligatory to 
tell the truth. TO-DR 
2. It's not permissible 
to betray a secret. TP-
DP 
 
1. It's obligatory to 
dress formally. TO-DP 




1. It's obligatory to do 
A.TO-DP 
2. It's permissible to do 
B. TP-DR 
Step 2:  
Punish, reward 
or ignore a total 
of eight people 
(time-sensitive). 
 


















How confident are you of your performance in the previous task? 
(not confident) 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 (very confident) 
TO = obligation type rule; TP = permission type rule; DP = punishment dilemma; DR = reward dilemma 
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In total, there were 96 judgments (8 reactions within each of 12 laws) rendered 
by a participant, and response times and accuracy were recorded and contrasted 
against content, type and induced dilemma. Since there were eight judgments per 
situation, median values of response times and accuracy were calculated for each 
situation. All except one experimental situation for response time, and two for 
accuracy, were within an acceptable range of +/-2 in measures of skewness and 
kurtosis. After excluding all results from those results that deviated more than 2.5 
standard deviations from the mean, skewness and kurtosis was reduced to a +/-1 
range. One participant was excluded for being too aberrant (+/- 3 standard deviations 
from the mean in multiple variables), and two for reporting that they did not 
understand the instructions. For descriptive data see Table 2 and Appendix B. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Main Effect of Content on Confidence, and Three-Way Interaction 
Effects of Content, Rule Type and Dilemma on Response Times and Accuracy 
 Content 
Abstract Convention Morality 
M SD M SD M SD 
 Rule type Dilemma  
Response time (ms)  
 Obligation Punishment 2482 730 2187 658 2534 736 
  Reward 2984 1014 2451 887 2777 1062 
 Permission Punishment 3268 1171 3157 1089 2962 1192 
  Reward 3301 1276 3243 1171 2912 973 
Level of accuracy 
 Obligation Punishment .87 .16 .89 .17 .83 .21 
  Reward .83 .19 .90 .15 .88 .15 
 Permission Punishment .79 .20 .78 .18 .83 .18 
  Reward .58 .32 .62 .23 .86 .16 
Confidence  
4.30 1.26 4.41 1.28 4.66 1.33 
 
Response Time and Accuracy 
 
A three-way (3x2x2) within-subjects ANOVA was calculated for both response 
time and accuracy. All three main effects – content, rule-type, and dilemma - were 
significant for both dependent variables. Furthermore, all two-way interaction effects 
were significant for accuracy. However, only content x type, and type x dilemma 
interactions were found for response times (see Table 3). Post-hoc Bonferroni tests 
for the main effect of content, as well as for all three two-way interactions were 
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ANOVA Results for Response Time and Accuracy Depending on Content, Rule Type and 
Dilemma 
 Response times Accuracy 
 F df Partial η2 F df Partial η2 
Content 11.33** 2/132 .146 19.71** 2/134 .227 
Rule 97.35** 1/  66 .596 121.47** 1/  67 .645 
Dilemma 12.26** 1/  66 .157 13.47** 1/  67 .167 
Content x Rule 13.79** 2/132 .173 32.31** 2/134 .325 
Content x Dilemma 2.83 2/132 .041 19.85** 2/134 .229 
Rule x Dilemma 5.34* 1/  66 .075 19.27** 1/  67 .223 
Content x Rule x Dilemma 1.91 2/132 .028 4.67* 2/134 .065 
* p < .05; ** p < .01.       
 
Main effects. Participants performed better in moral than abstract reasoning. 
Conventional reasoning was slower than moral, but more accurate than abstract 
reasoning. They performed better in obligation reasoning than permission reasoning, 
a result that produced a large effect size (RT: ηp2 = .596; accuracy: ηp2 = .645). 
Participants were also better in solving punishment dilemmas than reward dilemmas. 
Content x Rule type. Within all contents, participants performed faster while 
reasoning with obligations, though the gap seems to be narrower in moral content, 
and widest in conventional. A similar pattern is seen for accuracy: the gap was very 
wide for the conventional and abstract content, but it disappeared when it came to 
moral reasoning. There was no difference in accuracy of obligation reasoning across 
different contents. However, permission reasoning was lower in cases of abstract and 
conventional content, but significantly higher in moral content. Participants 
produced the fastest response for obligations in the conventional domain, but they 
were fastest to react to moral content when faced with permissions. 
Content x Dilemma. Punishment dilemmas were solved with identical success 
across rule contents, but reward dilemma accuracy climbed on a linear slope upwards 
from abstract to conventional to moral content, where it converged with punishment 
dilemma accuracy (Figure 2, right graph). Punishment dilemmas produced a faster 
response in conventional than in abstract reasoning. On the other hand, reward 
dilemmas produced a slower response in abstract reasoning as opposed to 
conventional and moral reasoning (Figure 2, left graph). Performance for solving 
punishment and reward dilemmas was equal in moral reasoning, but they were faster 
and more accurate in solving the punishment dilemma when reasoning abstractly, 
and more accurate during conventional reasoning. 
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In total, there were 96 judgments (8 reactions within each of 12 laws) rendered 
by a participant, and response times and accuracy were recorded and contrasted 
against content, type and induced dilemma. Since there were eight judgments per 
situation, median values of response times and accuracy were calculated for each 
situation. All except one experimental situation for response time, and two for 
accuracy, were within an acceptable range of +/-2 in measures of skewness and 
kurtosis. After excluding all results from those results that deviated more than 2.5 
standard deviations from the mean, skewness and kurtosis was reduced to a +/-1 
range. One participant was excluded for being too aberrant (+/- 3 standard deviations 
from the mean in multiple variables), and two for reporting that they did not 
understand the instructions. For descriptive data see Table 2 and Appendix B. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Main Effect of Content on Confidence, and Three-Way Interaction 
Effects of Content, Rule Type and Dilemma on Response Times and Accuracy 
 Content 
Abstract Convention Morality 
M SD M SD M SD 
 Rule type Dilemma  
Response time (ms)  
 Obligation Punishment 2482 730 2187 658 2534 736 
  Reward 2984 1014 2451 887 2777 1062 
 Permission Punishment 3268 1171 3157 1089 2962 1192 
  Reward 3301 1276 3243 1171 2912 973 
Level of accuracy 
 Obligation Punishment .87 .16 .89 .17 .83 .21 
  Reward .83 .19 .90 .15 .88 .15 
 Permission Punishment .79 .20 .78 .18 .83 .18 
  Reward .58 .32 .62 .23 .86 .16 
Confidence  
4.30 1.26 4.41 1.28 4.66 1.33 
 
Response Time and Accuracy 
 
A three-way (3x2x2) within-subjects ANOVA was calculated for both response 
time and accuracy. All three main effects – content, rule-type, and dilemma - were 
significant for both dependent variables. Furthermore, all two-way interaction effects 
were significant for accuracy. However, only content x type, and type x dilemma 
interactions were found for response times (see Table 3). Post-hoc Bonferroni tests 
for the main effect of content, as well as for all three two-way interactions were 
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Rule type x Dilemma. Keeping the content constant, participants solved the 
punishment dilemmas faster when reasoning about obligations, and more accurately 
in permission-type rules. While solving both dilemmas, participants were faster and 
more accurate in obligations than permissions. 
A deontic blind spot. As is obvious from Appendix C (right graph), there is a 
sharp decline of 21-25% in accuracy during tasks where undesirable actions were 
permitted (permission x reward dilemma situation). We termed this phenomenon a 
"deontic blind spot", and will expand upon this in the Discussion. However, it only 
affected conventional and abstract contents. Moral content produced a compensatory 
effect for the decline – accuracy did not differ between the four type x dilemma 
experimental situations.  
 
Judgments of Confidence 
 
Confidence levels were measured for three different contents: abstract, 
conventional and moral. Two types of analyses were performed to determine: (1) 
does confidence differ between contents?, and (2) does confidence correlate to 
response times or accuracy? Results for final confidence, as well as those for RT and 
accuracy, were first averaged between moral, conventional and abstract rules for 
every participant. 
Main effect. We performed a one-way within-subjects ANOVA on confidence 
levels between three contents. A significant content effect was found (F(2, 154) = 
5.31; p < .01; ηp2 = .068), and post-hoc analysis pointed to higher confidence in moral 
than in abstract content (for descriptive data see Table 2). 
RT and accuracy as predictors. In order to determine whether reaction time and 
accuracy separately predict the level of confidence, three multiple regression 
analyses were performed with confidence as the criterion, and response time and 
accuracy as predictors. Each analysis was conducted for each of the three contents. 
All three analyses found a significant correlation (R2(2/75) .22 to .26, p < .01). 
Confidence was predicted negatively by response time (β = -.28 to -.39, p < .01), and 





The goal of the study was to determine how different contents of rules, based 
on their deontic type and the dilemmas they induce, produce different performance 
and confidence outcomes. Content was varied between moral, conventional and 
abstract rules. The deontic type and induced dilemma depended on the deontic 
operator in the rule: obligation (obligation-type, punishment dilemma), non-
obligation (obligation-type, reward dilemma), permission (permission-type, reward 
dilemma), and non-permission (permission-type, reward dilemma).  
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In abstract deontic reasoning participants were on average significantly faster 
by 450-759 ms in processing rules that used the deontic operator obligatory 
(obligation rule type, punishment dilemma), than rules with the other three types of 
operators. However, they were also 20-27% significantly less accurate when 
reasoning with rules that used the operator permissible (Appendix C, right graph). 
It seems that abstract rules using the obligation operator produced a more fluent 
response, while permission operators produced a less accurate one. Non-obligation 
and non-permission operators produced a response that did not significantly differ 
from permission operators in response time, and with obligation operators in 
accuracy. A similar pattern was found when using conventional content. The 
difference is, performance with conventional rules seemed to be more dependent on 
the type of rule, while performance with abstract rules was more dependent on the 
induced dilemma. On the other hand, moral content produces a more uniform 
response across the other two variables. It also produced higher levels of confidence. 
As we hypothesized, response time correlated negatively with confidence 
ratings in all three contents. Interestingly, accuracy was found to correlate positively 
with confidence, a less common finding in the reasoning literature (see 
metacognition and dual processing in the Introduction), indicating response conflict 
was, for some reason, detected by metacognition (Ackerman & Thompson, 2015; 
Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). Furthermore, lower confidence for abstract rules 
than moral rules indicated that System 2 was more likely to be utilized in the abstract 
task, while moral rules were solved more intuitively (De Neys & Bialek, 2017) – 
which is in line with the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2012). 
 
Obligations and Permissions 
 
Although deontic logic permits any kind of content combined with any kind of 
deontic operator (Von Wright, 1951), in real life obligations govern desirable actions, 
and permissions govern undesirable ones. Therefore, it is impossible to disassociate 
the desirability of an action from the rule-type in this study. 
Results indicate better performance for obligation-type than for permission-type 
rules, and the effect sizes were considerable. Two different effects seem to 
simultaneously contribute: (1) an increase in performance when reasoning with 
conventional obligations, and (2) a "blind spot" for reasoning about rules that permit 
undesirable behaviour. The first effect is likely an artifact of convenient sampling – 
students might have more experience with reasoning around conventional 
obligations, leading to a more nuanced schema (e.g. do I have to do this homework, 
or is there a way around it?), while permission-type conventions tend to be more 
imperative in nature, thus possibly perceived as less malleable. Of course, this is 
purely speculative, and should be examined in subsequent studies. However, the fact 
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remains that the fastest and most accurate responses in the study were to conventional 




Every task induces only one of two types of dilemmas: either a punishment 
dilemma (to punish or to ignore) or a reward dilemma (to reward or to ignore). The 
dilemmas are induced by the type of constraint the rule imposes. Evolutionary and 
game theoretical modeling (Cosmides & Tooby, 2015) posits a set of evolved 
domain-specific modules that enable adaptive reasoning. An evolved cheater-
detection module makes people more biased toward the detection of rule violations, 
correctly predicting better performance in punishment dilemmas in the case of 
abstract and conventional content. This is perfectly illustrated in Figure 2 (right 
graph), where the accuracy rate for punishment, while controlling rule-type, is stable 
at 85%, independent of content. 
However, moral rules are an exception. While the ability to correctly solve the 
punishment dilemma remains constant across different contents, both the response 
times and accuracy for the two types of dilemmas seem to converge when reasoning 
with moral rules. Therefore, the activation of the altruist-detection module seems to 
match violation-detection only if the moral affect has been previously primed. 
It should be noted that sorting out violators, conformists, and altruists is not the 
same as reacting to them – even though participants were provided with precise 
instructions on how to solve the given tasks properly. Someone might be perceived 
as an altruist, or a violator, but if a participant considers the scope of the 
supererogatory act, or the severity of the violation as mild, he/she might not opt for 
a reward or punishment. Subsequent studies may examine in what degree this might 
be the case. 
 
A Deontic Blind Spot 
 
There seems to be a sharp drop in accuracy in situations that allow (undesirable) 
actions (see Figure 3). In such situations, a permission-type rule implies undesirable 
action, something that has been explicitly pointed out to participants in the 
instructions. Although the action is undesirable, since it is permitted, it should induce 
a reward dilemma. However, this does not often occur, a phenomenon we will refer 
to here as the "deontic blind spot". For example: 
It's permissible to do M. 
Carol did M. 
Melinda did not M. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Should Carol be: punished, ignored, or rewarded? 
Should Melinda be: punished, ignored, or rewarded? 
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Correct answers: Carol should be ignored, and Melinda should be rewarded. An 
average accuracy in this situation was about 61%. Curiously, this may not be 
accounted for entirely due to a lack of concrete content. For example: 
It's permissible to use your credit card. 
Carl used his credit card. 
Tim didn't use his credit card. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Should Carl be: punished, ignored, or rewarded? 
Should Tim be: punished, ignored, or rewarded? 
Correct responses were that Carl should be ignored, and Tim rewarded. Here, 
conventional content was used, yet the accuracy only went up (non-significantly) to 
65%. What makes finding an explanation for this phenomenon more difficult is the 
fact that when the rule is framed in moral terms, the "blind spot" seems to disappear, 
and the accuracy is approximately 86%. 
Any explanation for this phenomenon must include answers to the questions (1) 
why is there a drop off in accuracy?, and simultaneously (2) why does moral content 
compensate for it? The omission bias (underestimating the importance of harmful 
avoidance) might explain why accuracy dropped (DeScioli, Bruening, & Kurzban, 
2011), but it would not explain why this effect was not present in moral rules. One 
possibility is that moral reasoning might be qualitatively different from other forms 
of deontic reasoning. However, this still leaves us with the challenge of explaining 
the existence of the deontic blind spot in conventional and abstract reasoning. 
 
Is Moral Reasoning Special? 
 
In order to gain insight into moral reasoning processes, we contrasted the 
performance for rules with the moral content with two control contents: abstract and 
conventional. Abstract content was used to control the concrete content effect. Social 
conventions differ from moral rules because they lack intrinsic value. As the social-
intuitionist model predicts, moral content produces an automatic affect, thus likely 
priming a different deontic schema than abstract or conventional content. 
The existence of a special "moral reasoning schema", at least for reasoning with 
simple deontic premises, is supported by three findings in this study: 
(1) Moral, unlike conventional or abstract, deontic reasoning, does not depend 
on whether the rule is an obligation that governs desirable action, or a 
permission that governs undesirable ones. 
(2) Moral reasoning does not seem to favor violator-detection over altruist-
detection. 
(3) Moral reasoning is followed by higher confidence. 
This is not to say moral reasoning is not a type of deontic reasoning, rather it 
seems to engage different cognitive processes. Of course, many important factors 
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have not been controlled in this limited study, so that conclusion might in time prove 
to be premature. 
Future studies should focus on eliminating insufficiencies of this study: better 
practice tasks, empirically selected and balanced rules (e.g. we are unsure to what 
degree conventional and abstract rules were saturated with moral content), 
confidence judgments after every reaction, simpler instructions, etc. Also, to find the 
explanation for the "deontic blind spot" phenomenon, which we failed to account for. 
The task used here can be modified for a variety of research problems, and using 
deontic logic as a moral reasoning normative in general may help to provide better 
insight into our moral reasoning abilities. However, this approach is limited because 





Results indicate that: (1) moral rules are easier to process than conventional 
ones, and conventional rules easier than abstract ones, (2) punishment dilemmas are 
easier to solve than reward dilemmas, (3) obligations are easier to process than 
permissions, (4) confidence is higher for moral than abstract rules, and (5) in all three 
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Zadatak moralnoga deontičkog rasuđivanja:  




Teorija domena pretpostavlja da se moralna i konvencionalna pravila drugačije percipiraju i 
rezultiraju različitim odgovorima. Osmišljena je procedura za testiranje ove hipoteze u 
laboratorijskim uvjetima koristeći zadatak deontičkog rasuđivanja. Cilj je bio dobiti uvid u 
kognitivne i metakognitivne procese deontičkog rasuđivanja polazeći od jednostavnih deontičkih 
premisa. Korištenjem nacrta 3x2x2 s ponovljenim mjerenjima manipulirali smo sadržajem pravila 
(moralna, konvencionalna, apstraktna), tipom pravila (obaveze, dopuštenja) i induciranom dilemom 
(dilema kažnjavanja, dilema nagrađivanja). Sudionicima (N = 78) prikazano je 12 zakona. Nakon 
što su zapamtili zakon, prezentirano im je osam slučajeva za koje su morali donijeti brzu odluku. 
Zadatak im je bio kažnjavanje prekršitelja, ignoriranje konformista i nagrađivanje supererogatornih. 
Mjereno je vrijeme odgovora i točnost za svaku odluku te konačna sigurnost nakon jednog niza 
odluka. Nisu očekivane razlike između tipova pravila, ali je očekivana bolja izvedba kod moralnih 
sadržaja i dilema kažnjavanja. Vrijeme je odgovora bilo negativno, a točnost pozitivno povezana s 
razinom sigurnosti. Moralno rasuđivanje bilo je točnije od konvencionalnog i apstraktnog te je 
dovelo do više razine sigurnosti. Bolja je izvedba utvrđena pri dilemama kažnjavanja u usporedbi s 
nagrađivanjem, vjerojatno zbog prisutnosti modula za detekciju varalica, ali te razlike nisu utvrđene 
pri moralnom rasuđivanju. Moralno je rasuđivanje također bilo neovisno o tipu pravila, dok su 
konvencionalno i apstraktno rasuđivanje doveli do bolje izvedbe pri obavezama nego dopuštenjima. 
Sudić, M., Valerjev, P., Ćirić, J.: 
Deontic Moral Reasoning Task 
503 
Velik je pad u točnosti utvrđen za pravila koja su dopuštala nepoželjna ponašanja, što je fenomen 
koji smo nazvali "deontička slijepa pjega". Ipak, ova slijepa pjega nije bila prisutna pri moralnom 
rasuđivanju. Zaključno, rezultati upućuju na kvalitativne razlike između moralne domene i ostalih: 
(1) izvedba pri moralnom sadržaju nije ovisila o tipu pravila, (2) moralni je sadržaj proizveo jednaku 
aktivaciju modula detekcije varalica i altruista te (3) moralni je sadržaj proizveo viši stupanj 
sigurnosti. 
 










List of Laws and Rules Used in the Deontic Reasoning Task 
CONTENT LAWS/RULES 
Abstract  LAW 123: 
It's obligatory to do A. 
It's permissible to do B. 
LAW 456: 
It's obligatory to do X. 
It's not obligatory to do Y. 
LAW 789: 
It's not obligatory to do R. 
It's not permissible to do T. 
LAW 000: 
It's permissible to do M. 
It's not permissible to do N. 
Conventional  ID registration: 
It's obligatory to present proof of citizenship. 
It's permissible to pay later. 
Restaurant etiquette: 
It's obligatory to dress formally. 
It's not obligatory to compliment the chef. 
Car parking: 
It's not obligatory to turn on the blinkers. 
It's not permissible to take off your belt. 
Paying taxes: 
It's permissible to use your credit card. 
It's not permissible to use coins. 
Moral  House pets: 
It's obligatory to feed your pets. 
It's permissible to abandon your pet. 
Violence and intervention: 
It's obligatory to perform first aid. 
It's not obligatory to report violence. 
Lying and honesty: 
It's not obligatory to tell the truth. 
It's not permissible to betray a secret. 
Store delinquency: 
It's permissible to overspend. 
It's not permissible to shoplift. 
Note: Loosely translated from Croatian. 
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Descriptive Statistics for Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions of Content,  
Rule-Type and Induced Dilemma 
 Response time Accuracy 
M SD M SD 
Main effects     
Content     
   Abstract 3062 914 .76 .17 
   Conventional 2834 889 .79 .15 
   Moral 2841 903 .84 .14 
Rule-type     
   Obligations 2583 695 .87 .13 
   Permissions 3160 903 .74 .15 
Dilemma     
   Punishment 2783 727 .83 .14 
   Reward 2958 846 .78 .14 
 
Two-way interactions     
Content x Type     
   Abstract Obligations 2734 777 .85 .15 
   Abstract Permissions 3305 1087 .69 .21 
   Conventional Obligations 2348 744 .89 .14 
   Conventional Permissions 3226 1052 .69 .18 
   Moral Obligations 2663 816 .86 .15 
   Moral Permissions 2957 999 .84 .15 
 
Content x Dilemma     
   Abstract Punishment dilemmas 2871 820 .83 .16 
   Abstract Reward dilemmas 3172 1065 .70 .21 
   Conventional Punishment dilemmas 2702 800 .83 .16 
   Conventional Reward dilemmas 2868 938 .76 .16 
   Moral Punishment dilemmas 2762 863 .83 .16 
   Moral Reward dilemmas 2845 921 .87 .14 
 
Type x Dilemma     
   Obligation Punishment dilemmas 2414 619 .86 .16 
   Obligation Reward dilemmas 2756 870 .87 .13 
   Permission Punishment dilemmas 3169 977 .80 .15 
   Permission Reward dilemmas 3162 944 .68 .20 
 
  





List of Laws and Rules Used in the Deontic Reasoning Task 
CONTENT LAWS/RULES 
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It's not obligatory to report violence. 
Lying and honesty: 
It's not obligatory to tell the truth. 
It's not permissible to betray a secret. 
Store delinquency: 
It's permissible to overspend. 
It's not permissible to shoplift. 
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